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The following exposure of the RSI topological complexities, orienting all the possible 
(inter)subjectivity, plays on the following two pairs of polarities: external/internal and 
linguistic/affective (it may be added: structure and topology). Lacan introduces the 
third possibility of human experience: “extimacy”, linking what is both excluded and 
intimate. The concept is the lacking link leading from structuralist approaches to 
language to thoroughly affective subjectivity of any speaking being. Spinosa’s 
geometrical, highly dynamic system and his “differential calculus of affects” may 
account for the part that the vicissitudes of drive play in human existence as rooted in 
the deeply “extimate” sources. 
Introduction 
The main focus of this paper is to render how different layers of language in Lacan’s 
theory account for differing topologies of interiority/exteriority relations of affect. 
The RSI dimensions, in terms of which the concept of ‘extimacy’ (French extimité) 
will be exposed, are regarded here as different levels of the topological determinants 
of the human subjectivity, which always exists as intersubjectivity. Otherwise 
speaking, they are the three ways in which the outside/inside relationships manifest 
themselves linguistically and affectively. The word ‘levels’ doesn’t denote the higher 
or lower ‘place’ this manifestation would allegedly occupy in the (inter)subjective 
experience of the human being. Rather, it renders the degree of externality in its 
relations with regard to the intimate of the subject in each of these spheres. It has to 
do with the quantitative difference which distinguishes each of them (however, there 
is an 
assumption here: some growth in quantity may change the quality, and even the 
essence, of the thing in question). The three distinct, although interrelated (in fact, 
even interpenetrated by one another), structures account for the fact that in every of 
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the three cases both the ‘outside’ and its contradiction are defined in their own (and 
perhaps even incomparable with the two remaining definitions) ways. However, not 
without an eye to a bit of intelligibility, the goal of these short remarks would be 
aiming at a sort of comparison of the three incomparabilities. Of course, it will be 
accompanied by a reluctant admittance of the unavoidable - perhaps even reductionist 
in some measure - privilege accorded to the chosen aspects of the triplex phenomenon 
of ‘extimacy’2.  
The Methodological Difficulties 
The following exposition of the RSI topological complexities, as orienting all the 
possible human (inter)subjectivity, is based mainly on the following, two fundamental 
pairs of polarities: external/internal and linguistic/affective. The Lacanian great trinity 
(RSI) appears in any particular case as resulting from multiform vicissitudes of drive. 
As such, it constitutes the three basic, indispensable factors, generating the structured 
reality 3. In this case affects might be understood as different manifestations of the 
phenomenological derivative of drive, that is, desire. The structural 4 generates5 these 
or those affects, experienced by people on the daily basis. The totality of all the 
affects is interrelated with the set of particular, singular effects 6. Here we have the 
necessary equivalency to the indispensable other side of the (post)structure as 
determining the linguistic (inter)subjectivity, so to say, its twin-like reverse. 
Obviously, this approach is inseparably joined with a serious methodological 
difficulty. There is one problem underlying such topological, obverse-reverse, two-
                                                2	  However,	   after	   having	   written	   these	   last	   three	   sentences	   I	   realize	   the	   total	  impossibility	   of	   rendering	   the	   radicalism	   of	   this	   idea.	   How	   to	   put	   the	  way	   the	  Lacanian	   approach	   functions	   –	   as	   it	   is	   connoted	   by	   the	   term	   ‘extimacy’	   -­‐	   into	  words	  of	  our	  common	  language?	  Perhaps	  the	  solution	  would	  be	  something	   like	  that	  which	  Lévinas	  applied	   in	  one	  of	  his	   latest	  books	  Otherwise	  Than	  Being	  or	  Beyond	   Essence,	   where	   he	   attempted	   to	   show	   the	   ineffable	   something	   of	   his	  intuitions	   concerning	   the	   ‘transcendence-­‐in-­‐immanence’.	   Namely,	   he	   just	   tried,	  literally,	   to	   ‘break	   the	   links’,	   ‘resolve’,	   in	   any	   way	   remaining	   at	   his	   disposal:	  somehow	  ‘undo’	  the	  linguistic	  ‘ties’	  or	  ‘knots’,	  disorganizing	  the	  structural	  order	  of	  the	  human	  thought,	  by	  deforming	  it	  to	  the	  ultimate	  limits	  of	  intelligibility.	  Or	  rather:	   he	   left	   us	   with	   only	   a	   minimal	   residuum	   of	   this	   structure,	   nearly	  balancing	   (in	   fact:	   very	   skillfully	   ‘dancing’)	   on	   the	   edge	   separating	   sense	   from	  nonsense,	   in	   order	   to	   manifest	   this	   ‘plus-­‐de-­‐sense’	   that	   is	   conditioned	   by	   the	  necessary	  element	  of	  the	  nonsensical,	  hidden	  behind	  the	  common	  possibilities	  of	  speaking.	  3	  	  Here	  ‘reality’	  means	  that	  which	  is	  revealed	  and	  displayed	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  analytic	  experience.	  4	  Although	   Lacan	   tends	   to	   consider	   ‘structure’	   and	   ‘topology’	   as	   equivalent,	  however,	  his	  understanding	  of	   ‘structure’	   is	   rather	   transgressing	   its	   traditional	  definition,	  and	  that’s	  why	  I	  tried	  to	  take	  into	  regard	  his	  ambivalence	  by	  writing	  the	  most	  frequently	  ‘(post)structural’,	  to	  remind	  the	  reader	  the	  depart	  from	  the	  ‘classical’	  structuralism	  5	  	  And	  is	  constantly	  being	  generated	  by	  them.	  6	  	  The	  words	   ‘affect’	   and	   ‘effect’	  have	  much	   in	   common,	  not	  only	  understood	   in	  the	  categories	  of	  ‘family	  resemblance’,	  or	  as	  two	  similar	  constellations	  of	  letters	  and	  their	  pronouncement	  but	  also	  the	  nodal	  point	  in	  the	  signifying	  net.	  




sided7 characteristics of any subjectivity as such. It consists in the impossibility of 
seeing the polarized aspects all at once. If you are focused on one pole within each 
pair of different - and differing from each other - polarities8, it’s very difficult not to 
be partial, or at least superficial, trying to render justice to both one and the other of 
the two. This usually seems to result in the other (more or less involuntarily meant to 
be less important) remaining at least partly concealed. In the worst case, it may 
disappear out of sight in its totality. However, even in case of such unfortunate (for 
any rigorous analysis) circumstances, it’s helpful to think that the underestimated 
‘side’ is always, if only silently, included in the contradictory dyad. Actually, each of 
the terms is logically9  present in its absence as far as absent in its presence, assuming 
that presence and absence mutually condition each other. They seem to function as, 
alternately, the indispensable foreground and background, and - as is known - both of 
them are necessary for any sense to be generated. As such, they are indispensable for 
any meaningful opposing, negating (and also affirming, etc.), contradicting operations. 
In this way, they can enable all the necessary differentiations to provide us with the 
bases that are the fundamental condition of any possible communication. This neglect 
or disregard of the ‘eclipsed’ polarity has its source in the dualism being the leading 
rule of the human cognition and representing what is deemed to be the ‘true’ reality. 
As Lacan jokingly notices, we must learn to count, as only this can enable us to 
follow his investigations, proceed in apprehending what he wants to say and - 
possibly – embracing our own destiny 10. 
The Main Problem  
How to pass from the (post)structural to affect is a difficulty that any viable theory of 
the subject must face and take into consideration. This is necessary, if it tries, firstly, 
to preserve the requirements of logic (also in its non-classical formulations), rigor and 
consistence, postulated by contemporary philosophy. Secondly, this necessity obtains 
if we want to stay unwaveringly faithful to the actual reality of the human 
(inter)subjective experience in all of its highly nuanced complexity, intricacy and, 
sometimes, ineffability.   
 
Some of the crucial problems connected with certain modern approaches constitute 
the main ‘culprits’ of the omnipresent, dualistic beliefs. For example, the commonly 
acknowledged convictions about the rigidity of language-affect separateness, about 
intellect-passion isolation. What seems forgotten is the known and experienced fact of 
the impossibility to conceive any purely intellectual thought without its emotional 
‘aura’. And vice versa: emotions normally have its cognitive contents. This tendency 
                                                7	  Even	  if	  in	  the	  Moebian	  sense.	  	  	  	  8	  Like,	  for	  example:	  linguistic	  vs	  affective,	  structural	  vs	  topological	  (according	  to	  Lacan,	   there	   is	   an	   important	   difference	   between	   them),	   external	   vs	   internal,	  intimate	  vs	  public,	  objective	  vs	  subjective,	  immanent	  vs	  transcendent,	  empirical	  vs	  transcendental,	  etc.	  9	  Based	   on	   the	   logic	   of	   language	   /thought/sense	   as	   operating	   by	   means	   of	  oppositions.	  10	  The	   anxiety-­‐related	   connotations	   of	   the	   word	   ‘apprehension’	   are	   used	   here	  quite	  intentionally:	  if	  we	  knew	  the	  future	  happenings	  of	  our	  life,	  our	  fate,	  for	  the	  most	  part	  we	  probably	  wouldn’t	  wish	   to	   live	  any	   longer	  out	  of	  horror	   felt	   as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  knowledge.	  




to reason in terms of the contradiction between the just characterized concepts is 
prevailing in the contemporary thought. As its core consists in clinging to the 
uncontested belief in the inside/outside opposition as if its terms were two extreme 
kinds of ‘space’, having nothing in common. The split between the linguistic and 
affective realms opens into an authentic abyss, ready to swallow every daredevil who 
would try to surpass it. It finds its reflection in the relevant ‘turns’ that appeared quite 
recently in the course of the history of philosophical thought and the general cultural 
orientation11.  
 
Summerizing, the ‘ex’/‘in’ dualism makes it extremely difficult to pass from the 
(post)structural to the affective, and join them in order to get some consistent 
characteristics of the subjec 12 . The Lacanian theory calls into question these 
contradictory pairs of ‘sides’, constituting the human (inter)subjectivity. It tries to 
reconcile what is imaginarily separated. Its means are various examples taken from 
mathematical topology, especially of ‘impossible’ figures, like the Moebius strip, the 
torus, as well as other paradoxical forms, e.g., the cross-cap; the Klein-bottle, etc., 
denouncing the relevant oppositions as illusive and untenable in their hitherto forms.  
 
For example, as far as the Moebius band is concerned, what we take to be its two 
sides somehow turns out to be only one, although no clear, distinct ‘passage’ is 
perceived. Similarly, as far as the ‘two-sided’ (structured as polarized in any of the 
above-mentioned ways) vision of human (inter)subjectivity is concerned, there are 
certain, special points where the exterior and the interior imperceptibly pass into each 
other. Applying the Lévinasian concept of the ‘transcendence-in-immanence’ 
(Lévinas, 1911), the otherness is constitutive of the sameness 13 (and the other way 
round). The same could be said about the language/structure-oriented and affect-
related aspects of the human mind. We can look at them like Wittgenstein’s analysis, 
found in the chapter xi of Philosophical Investigations, shows. What we perceive 
alternatelyas a rabbit/hare and a duck must be considered, as the author concludes, to 
be the two possible ‘ways of seeing’ of the one and the same picture (Wittgenstein, 
118, p. 204). A quite similar reasoning might be applied to the idea of the human 
mind, as essentially relational in joining concepts. Or even better: its multi-referential 
characteristics enable us to see the same from two or more possible points of view 14. 
Perhaps the described methodological difficulty might have something to do with this 
                                                11	  We	   know	   how	   difficult	   it	   is	   to	   reconcile	   different	   linguistic	   and	   affective	  characteristics	   of	   the	   human	   subject,	   although	   functioning	   nearly	   seamlessly	  together	  on	  the	  daily	  basis.	  This	  explains	  the	  necessity	  of	  ‘turns’,	  focusing	  for	  the	  most	   part	   or	   nearly	   exclusively	   on	   one	   of	   these	   two	   terms	   of	   the	   regarded	  dualism	  (and	  other	  ones).	  12	  Phenomenologically	  manifesting	   itself	  as	  a	  certain	  determinate	  stream	  of	   the	  	  indiscrete,	   seamless	   experience,	   unless	   ‘punctuated’	   in	   a	   way	   proper	   to	   the	  process	  that	  is	  governed	  by	  desire.	  13	  The	  dualism	  of	  transcendent/immanent	  or	  otherness/sameness	  is	  just	  another	  example	  that	  may	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  range	  of	  problems	  investigated	  in	  this	  paper.	  The	  Lévinasian	  expresssion	  ‘trancendence-­‐in-­‐immanence’	  might	  be	  another	  way	  of	  expressing	  the	  ideas	  encapsulated	  in	  Lacan’s	  neologism	  extimité.	  14	  	  In	  the	  Lacanian	  reformulation	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  division:	  structural	  and	  affective,	  external	  and	  internal,	  etc.	  




– sometimes difficult - ‘flip-flop’ jumping from one interpretation to the other. In 
order to avoid any ambiguity, we prefer stay a bit too stiff. However, at the same time 
we lose the possibility of gaining knowledge, or what’s more important, according to 
Lacan: getting closer to the truth 15. 
 
Another problem to be taken into consideration consists in the following trouble: the 
connotations of the word ‘structure’ evoke the static concepts, suggesting something 
essentially immobile, inert and inflexible. Meanwhile, the dynamic experience of 
affect doesn’t seem to harmonize with our common, habitual trials to describe its 
process-like, fluid, unstable nature by using these ‘stiff’, unrelenting terms. This 
problem will be undertaken in the next part, perhaps allowing for the discussion and a 
certain resolution of the difficulties just described. The proposed solution would 
perhaps seem surprising, as it implicates referring to the old, classical philosophy of 
Spinosa. Let’s take a closer look at his system. 
Return to Spinosa as a Solution 
Why should we regard the return to such an old theory, as is the Spinosian one, in the 
context of the Lacanian investigations, as one of the instruments which may turn out 
the searched-for solution. Namely, the one the consistence of which would be helpful 
in the dissolution of the described dualisms within the framework of a strictly 
systematic, unitary theory, able to form a multifaceted but non self-contradictory 
concept of the subject. The answer lies in the fact that the rigorous and stringent, 
quasi-mathematical system, based on axioms, definitions, deductions, etc., elaborated 
by the author of Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order is at the same time a 
highly dynamic theory of affects. It conceptualizes the affective subject and renders 
the energetic movement of his/her emotional experience in such a way that it can be 
interpreted in mathematical terms, as situated in a kind of linguistic ‘quasi-space’. As 
Lacan would say, any change of affect is inseparable from a certain change of the 
subjective configuration in the net of signifiers, that is, from the corresponding 
movement in the linguistic realm. This set of concepts joins neatly the 
(post)structuralist approach with the notion of the language-affect inseparability. It 
also undermines other, above-mentioned oppositions, which disappear in the universal 
‘space’ that doesn’t need any ‘outside’ or ‘inside’, pierced and penetrated by the 
never-ending movement of conatus. We could even qualify this dynamic geometrical 
approach - using more contemporary terms - a differential theory of the affective 
speaking-being. In fact, it seems to constitute the only, unique example of something 
like a differential calculus of affects, providing us with a kind of ancestor of the 
strictly topological formalizations conceptualized by the later Lacan. Using Spinosa’s 
differential, energetic categories of the smallest possible increase and decrease 
enables us to formulate movements and transformations of affective energy in such a 
way that seems to preserve the characteristics of credibility and reliability of any 
viable theory. When increasing or decreasing energy that characterizes conatus/drive 
achieves a certain critical point, the change of the corresponding 
mathematical/linguistic sign takes place. These transformations account for the 
always changing, sometimes literally ‘swirling’ dynamics of human discourse and 
                                                15	  	  Let’s	  repeat:	  we	  tend	  to	  lose	  from	  our	  sight	  that	  perhaps	  more	  than	  one	  aspect	  may	  be	  exactly	  what	  comes	  into	  play,	   that	  we	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  third,	  fourth,	  etc.,	  factor,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  perceive	  the	  whole	  complexity	  of	  the	  situation.	  




affect in their mutual interpenetration, their milder ‘moves’ as well as more violent 
turbulences 16. These differential concepts of the smallest possible increase and 
decrease might be regarded as discrete ‘elements’, a sort of ‘points’, distinguished 
from one another, however appearing and manifesting themselves as the basis for  
some presumed continuity 17.. They prepare the fertile ground for the theory of the 
human subject that would be based on ‘extimacy’ and ‘de-centeredness’, linking 
structural and affective approaches into one coherent conception of (inter)subjectivity.  
‘Referentiability’ and The Three Levels of ‘Extimacy’ 
As is clear now, the subject of Spinoza, since it is driven by conatus, desires to be and 
that’s why it needs more desire, which explains its ‘extimate’ nature and the necessity 
to reach beyond itself. However, what must be explicitly underlined, is the fact that 
the concept of ‘extimacy’ (extimité) will be exposed here in a deliberately not quite 
orthodox way 18, as the manner of rendering the inseparability of the linguistic and 
affective aspects of the human subject. The logic of the concept of ‘extimacy’, which 
is a neologism deriving from ‘exterior’ and ‘intimacy’, seems to call into question – 
as has already been said - some presumptions underlying certain contemporary 
philosophical and psychological theories. As has been said above, by means of this 
seemingly vague, at first sight ‘estranged’ concept, Lacan delivers a different 
conceptualization of the human psyche. The result is a kind of an essentially 
‘referential’, separate but dependent, non-individualistic subject. That is, whose 
intimate ‘center’ is continuous with what is ‘external’ and ‘peripheral’ (‘ex-centric’, 
‘de-centered’) with regard to him or her. The underlying idea is that every human 
being, even before his or her birth 19, is immerged in, and defined by, the apparently 
‘outer’ – especially relational – world, becoming at last his/her own ‘inner’ realm. 
That’s why the main terms of this approach are concepts of ‘relationality’, 
                                                16	  	   The	   full	   theory	   of	   affective	   experiences	   requires	   underlining	   the	   essential	  differences	   between	   them.	   There’s	   little	   place	   here	   for	   a	   detailed	   analysis,	  however,	   one	   remark	   is	   important:	   needless	   to	   say,	   there’s	   an	   important,	   not	  only	  etymological,	  difference	  between	  ‘emotion’	  and	  ‘affect’.	  The	  former	  means	  a	  certain	   active	  movement	   forward	   (‘out	   of	   oneself’),	   directed	   to	   the	  determined	  ‘exterior’:	   as	   suggests	   Latin	   [e]movere.	  While	   the	   latter’s	   sense	   (Latin	  affectus),	  understood	  also	  in	  its	  meaning	  of	  ‘direction’)	  preserves	  a	  compelling	  association	  with	   passiveness	   and	   surrender	   to	   the	   unavoidable	   (like	   an	   affection	   –	   which	  even	   has	   ‘illness’,	   or	   ‘sickness’	   as	   certain	   of	   its	   meanings)	   that	   attacks	   us	   as	  helpless	  and	  defenseless.	  Let’s	  notice	  in	  passing	  that	  the	  prefix	  ‘a’	  often	  signifies	  powerlessness	   and	   inertness	   in	   the	   face	   of	   that	   to	  which	  we	  must	   subdue	   and	  give	   in	   (this	   ‘a’	   doesn’t	   of	   course	   determine,	  whether	   the	   dominating	   factor	   is	  ‘positive’	  or	   ‘negative’)	  That	  remains	  highly	  relative,	  as	   it	  may	  be	  good,	  helpful,	  supporting,	  or	  inversely:	  destroying	  and	  devastating	  for	  us.	  Incidentally,	  it	  would	  be	   interesting	   to	  explore	   the	  possible	   links	   joining	   the	  prefix	   ‘a’	  with	  objects	  a,	  especially	  with	  an	  eye	  on	  some	  of	  their	  characteristics.	  17	  According	  to	  Lacan,	  the	  continuity	  of	  drive	  would	  correspond	  to	  the	  incessant	  movement	   of	   the	   metonymic	   chain.	   The	   ‘rings’	   of	   this	   string	   would	   tie	   the	  elements	  of	  the	  sequence,	  signifying	  substitutional	  objects	  of	  desire.	  18	  Although,	  the	  precise	  Lacanian	  use	  of	  the	  term	  will	  be	  indicated	  in	  the	  text.	  19	  Moreover,	  even	  before	  any	  idea	  of	  his	  or	  her	  any	  possible	  conception.	  




‘intersubjectivity’, or more radically: ‘referentiality’20. It denotes not only an ability 
but, first of all, necessity, characterized by contingency – of being a term of numerous 
‘references’ to (and for) many different ‘others’. Or, otherwise speaking, a singular 
‘point of reference’, to and from which invisible ‘rays’ radiate in, and from, all 
conceivable directions, to and from other ‘points of reference’. ‘Referentiability’ (the 
ability/necessity to refer) is what actually enables one to live and enacts any acting in  
accordance with one’s desire. It’s the earliest affective mark left on everything that 
happens (on the first and any following one another element of the signifying chain) 
and in the speaking creature it always takes the form of a linguistic sign (or of its 
substitute). That is why the human subject is not any pure distanced mind but a 
speaking-being whose existence starts at the exact moment of experiencing affect, that 
is, of being affected, by realizing the first originary reference. As defined by any 
affective event written in language (linguistic matter), he/she is unavoidably 
determined by his or her own incarnated, bodily status. In the measure of 
experiencing ever and ever bigger, more complicated ‘pieces’ of the world (that is, 
being affected by diversified aspects of the Other), the ‘text’ becomes ever and ever 
longer. Then certain sequences start to repeat themselves and ‘writing’ engages both 
affect and linguistic thought, which are indivisible. These are the basic assumptions of 
the further investigation as well as the searched premature answer that requires 
scrupulous analyzing of the ways it was formulated. 	  
Let’s start this difficult enterprise from accentuating the main assumption: what we 
desperately need here is a ‘good enough’ metaphor. Instead of some chaotic 
metonymic circulation characterizing displacement, it must be able to deepen the 
hidden meanings that in the vertical order of substitution (condensation) may 
enlighten one another. The metaphoric chain could be compared to anchoring our 
thought to a kind of Ariadne’s thread that would show us the way out of the labyrinth 
of metonymic errance among innumerable significations. As we have just established, 
the best paradigmatic category would be the Spinosian figure of differential increases 
and decreases as the smallest energetic changes in the (inter)subjective field. This 
choice allows for illuminating even the slightest nuances of affective-linguistic 
processes, rooted in the highly ordered, systematic framework. This is especially 
important for grasping different transformations of the way in which the subject 
represents himself/herself. However, first of all, this enables us to understand these 
changes of the self-representation that have their origin in the internalized Other as 
the primary source of affection. This radical otherness which can never be assimilated 
totally by the sameness, which is equally transcendental as transcendent, always 
escaping dissolution in the immanence that tries to devour anything that differs. The 
ineffable otherness enacts all the multiple differentiations of the subject’s identity that 
are presented to the Other as the most important point of reference. 
Spinosian ‘Substance’ as Constitutive of (Inter)Subjectivity: 
Exposition and Sharing 
Before the characterization of ‘extimacy’ in its triple manifestation, let’s focus on 
some Spinosian contributions to understanding how Lacan defines the human subject. 
Although it seems obvious, it’s never superfluous to remind that Lacan remains in 
                                                20	  As	   is	  obvious,	  we	  needn’t	  relate	  with,	  while	  referring	  to,	  or	  being	  referred	  to	  by,	  someone	  or	  something.	  




perfect agreement with Spinosa’s first definition in the section “Definitions of the 
emotions” in his Ethics: (I) ‘Desire is the very essence of man insofar as his essence is 
conceived as determined to any action from any given affection of itself’ (Spinosa, 
2002, p. 311). The next similarity has its roots in the basic logical requirements that 
both of the authors assumed as best summarizing the nature of the human subject. The 
subject is defined in terms of this or that affect. What Spinosa calls ‘substance’ acts or 
operates by means of affects, which causes the emergence of the incipient subjectivity 
as referenced to what appears as other. In this sense the ‘substance’ could be 
considered as a formal, logical vehicle (with no strictly defined empirical content), for 
which we might substitute anything, like for example, the human nervous system, or 
any other ‘matter’, being a kind of ‘hardware’, into which any particular (because 
dependent on the randomness of the particular human fate) ‘software’ might be 
‘installed’. As it was mentioned above, Spinosa underlines the contingency of the 
human destiny: ‘[…] we are in many respects at the mercy of external causes and are 
tossed about like the waves of the sea when driven by contrary winds, unsure of the 
outcome and of our fate’ (Spinosa, 2002, p. 310).  
 
Let’s follow further this metaphorization. We must omit the answer to the question 
asking what the ‘substance’ is, what form and characteristics of its existence are. It’s 
unessential for our further investigations. We must focus on what is necessary from 
the perspective of its every, newly born, ‘inhabitant’. Does the ‘substance’ have any 
boundaries? From the point of view of its ‘guests’, it is infinite and unlimited, it has 
neither origin nor end. As far as the human entity is unaware of its possible limits, he 
or she can preserve to a greater or lesser degree a certain sense of security, trust and 
self-confidence. Even the little child has many examples of ‘the otherness’ (in the 
beginning often assimilated to ‘the sameness’) that he/she can refer to. They function 
as a kind of ‘corrective experience’, allowing to alleviate the anxiety, even panic, the 
source of which is equivalent to more or less remembered suffering, being the 
remnants of the primary trauma. It must be mentioned that this first trauma may 
constitute the described-above originary experience of a strong affect that starts the 
process of ‘signifierness’ (‘signifiance’) that is, of linking every signifier with its 
signified (generation of significations). It is only in this way that it brings to life a 
kind of pre-subject and becomes a condition of possibility for a kind of 
(inter)subjective proto-space that will contain later experiences. The primary 
subjectivity has two universal crucial attributes: sharing and exposition: It shares the 
nature of all similar linguistic-affective beings, especially their vulnerability, as well 
as it exists as constantly exposed to anything regarded as other, for good and evil. If 
the process of the corrective ‘healing’ isn’t endangered by any serious disturbance, 
the little human subject remains initially for some time immersed in the state of the 
uninterrupted primary narcissism and very rarely shows any signs of consciousness 21. 
                                                21	  	  As	  may	   be	   a	   bit	   pessimistically	   said,	   the	   developing	   psyche	   ‘rests’	   after	   the	  mentioned	   initiatory	   trauma	   (be	   it,	   e.	   g.,	   the	   trauma	   of	   birth,	   or	   any	   other	  ‘thallassal’-­‐like	   apocalypse)	   and	   reintegrates	   its	   forces	   to	   survive	   the	   next	  traumatic	   event	   to	   come.	   According	   to	   the	   ’thalassal’	   theory	   of	   Ferencsi,	   the	  personal	   history	   of	   becoming	   a	   subject	   reaches	   as	   far	   as	   to	   the	   pre-­‐historical	  sequence	  of	  catastrophes	  transgressing	  the	  limits	  of	  any	  individual	  life	  (Ferencsi,	  1968).	  




If this ‘autistic’, totally passive state 22 lasts long enough, the drive can begin to flow 
freely and try some first cathexes. The young organism starts to register what happens 
around with a ‘fresh’ eye and in a non defensive way. At first sight the ‘substance’ 
seems to be in a constant, highly dynamical movement, its surface producing 
multiform waves, wrinkles, turbulences and whirls. It provides its ‘foundlings’- those 
at first totally helpless and vulnerable entities - with its overflowing energy of life. It 
shares itself with them its potency and resistance, which allows for the growth of the 
ability to differentiate and valuate. It is just this ability that enables them to change 
themselves and the world by making use of the constant, gradual intensifying and 
diminishing energy, resulting in the production of the first meanings. The all-
embracing ‘substance’ is constantly circulating and especially encircling those who 
need it most (the most traumatized and unable to survive without help). The energy, 
never stopping its flow, actuates and excites partly dormant drives, sharing with 
‘castaways’ its own dynamism. It does so trustingly exposing itself on whatever an 
individual does with this gift – like wasting it, squandering it or maybe…sharing it 
with the closest ones, with the neighbors. Otherwise speaking, becoming similarly 
exposed and sharing. It could be said that the ‘energy’ of these above mentioned 
movements becomes greater or smaller depending on the fact in whose ‘hands’ it will 
find the ‘proper’ place, where it can fully develop its dynamics. If the quantity of 
energy grows or diminishes to the sufficient degree, what follows is the change of 
value marked by the change of the sign into the opposite one (‘plus’ becomes ‘minus’ 
and vice versa), which initiates the process of ‘signifiance’23.  
 
In summary, the first symbols of primary affective experiences (according to Lacan, 
we substitute «1» for what is experienced as ‘good’ and «0» for ‘bad’) are the effects 
of the fact how the all-surrounding otherness refers to us (and of how we refer to it). 
In the beginning, the meanings of these first events of sharing and being exposed are 
‘borrowed’ from the Other, offering them to us when we try to make sense of what 
happens in our life. And it is never enough to repeat and accentuate that it is at first 
the Other that ‘estimates’ the greater or smaller degree of closeness to, or remoteness 
from, the desired perfection, which the ‘substance’ strives to achieve. It is only later 
on that the particular subject takes over the task of evaluating which meanings tend to 
signal the growth connected with the desired ideal attributes and starts to ascribe 
values. Such is the origin of rivalry and aggressiveness that may be destructive when 
they reach their extreme degree. The basic difference between human beings and 
other living entities appears when the energy of the animal instinct, becomes 
structured for the human subject as ‘binarized into drive’ by means of symbols and 
the parl’être starts to manifest one’s own desire by way of a whole gamut of affects, 
emotions, feelings, moods and other affective experiences.  
 
The Genesis of the Subject and the World 
The origin of the world consists in the fact that the ‘substance’ undergoes further and 
more complex structuration of the imaginary in terms of symbolizations of more and 
more higher order. The Other introduces law, the rules of which are supposed to be 
                                                22	  	   However,	   abounding	   in	   intensive,	   although	   usually	   externally	   imperceptible	  transformations	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  libido.	  23	  	  The	  result	  of	  the	  process	  is	  the	  development	  of	  particular	  configurations	  of	  the	  first	  pairs	  of	  signifiers.	  




observed. The differentiation is accompanied by condensation of signifying elements 
into ‘meta-signifiers’ until, finally, certain ‘master signifiers’ take the lead in the 
person’s life. The particular ‘wrinkles’ on the surface of the ever-changing topology 
of the world, although designated by the same word, are different from one another. 
However, they are supposed to join into greater entities, like ’waves’, thanks to the 
common signifier that subsumes them into more complex wholes. All of this produces 
(as, so to speak, its effect) the speaking subject. What we could remark here is that the 
beginning of the subject’s existence starts at the same time when he/she recognizes 
(but never gets to know) the Other in the absolute otherness. This total otherness is 
impossible to be penetrated, although it appears to have something to do with the last 
trace referring to the desired, primal object. It points at the direction of this object, the 
one that always comes too early to be remembered by the subject - who’s always too 
late to register its presence - and that’s why it seems to be always already and forever 
lost. The nostalgia for the desired Other incessantly accompanies the process that 
consists in the fact that the rules, laws, and the whole order structured by the net of 
signifiers organize themselves into the world as such, and the lost object of longing 
recedes to the unconscious. At this precise moment the subject may easily ‘forget’ 
that he/she desires and what is the object of this desire. 
 
If the Spinosian ‘substance’, in its constant energetic flow, can be interpreted as 
something like an ocean or river, this forgetfulness takes over at the moment when the 
main ‘stream’ (conscious thinking) starts to produce subsequent metaphoric 
substitutes of the desire. Then the consciousness would be equivalent with the 
signified, generated by the signifying elements, which constitute the unconscious, the 
stream’s hidden ‘undercurrents’. These are constantly circling around certain peculiar 
‘areas’, which could be described, by reason of their unique character, as the points 
that center around themselves the deepest flows of water.  
 
The analytical experience confirms that there are certain singular points of 
‘peculiarities’, having absolutely particular character as their status of ‘attractors’ 
exerts great influence. Of course, what comes into play here, is that which Lacan 
distinguishes as ‘objects a’ by referring them to what is archaic, a kind of ‘remnants’ 
of something that was lost and doesn’t seem to have any place in the present reality. 
The loss is all the more poignant, deep and intense that the ‘cut-off’ objects a’s status 
is highly unclear: it’s not sure if the ‘remainders’ were parts of the subject or of the 
lost object of desire. That’s one of the reasons to define their mode of being as 
‘extimate’ par excellance. When we apply the above metaphor, their essential destiny 
is staying in the stream with their parts being partly ‘cut off’ and remaining outside 
the current, like ‘castaways’ thrown by the waves onto the shore, not devoid of their 
highly attracting, if ambiguous, character. Therefore, anyone who has become the 
subject of the signifier, the desiring subject, is ‘extimate’ throughout: what is the most 
precious to him/her, remains outside, deeply hidden in this outside that forms the 
center of the unconscious. One can only search for its substitutes in others, not 
knowing what exactly one is looking for, since the best word to describe it is ‘lack’. 
The subject’s most intimate interior, equivalent with the essential center of his/her 
being is, in fact, external: while staying in the stream, he/she is constantly attracted by 
what is ‘out’.  
 
What is worthy of repetition and underlining is the potent, incessant dynamism of the 
process, which, beginning with the initial, omnipresent, ‘thalassal’ chaos, through the 




first ‘differentials’ singled out, leads to delimiting the ordered ‘substance’ of the 
(inter)subjective world. Along with it, through the movement of its own logic, 
particular subjects are called into existence. Maybe, as some theorists believe, the life 
in this world, especially when realized in the form of genital love relationships, would 
be only the consolation after the loss of that ‘thalassal’, pre-apocalyptical, blissful 
existence. Referring to this traumatic loss, we can say that the appearing of the 
Spinosian ‘substance’ (however interpreted) after the trauma, might be compared to 
the origination of a necessary spatiotemporal matrix, the ‘place’ where the first 
signifying elements can appear 24.  
 
The trauma as enforcing the formation of the spatiotemporal psychical matrix would 
play an ambiguous role. Firstly, it leaves its traces as a way to remember the pre-
traumatic, paradisiac state of being and incite the striving to achieve a partial, 
substitutive, thoroughly ‘extimate’ recreation of its memories. The traumatic, however 
repressed, is a cause of painful affects: anxiety and suffering associated with this loss, 
although, at the same time, it paradoxically assures protection before similar, future 
damages by helping the psyche to strengthen itself 25. The ‘thalassa’ and the later 
primal traumas remain ‘coded’ as partly conditioning the awakening of the psyche of 
the future subject 26, in-sisting not to be forgotten, which requires constant repetition.  
The Singularized Topology as a Source of the Individual Fate 
and Human Destination 
In the previous section it was said that the ‘substance’ differentiates itselfinto distinct, 
independent ‘waves’, by distinguishing out of its fluent, continuous flow some 
singular discrete elements, scattered but ordered. The ‘calculation’, availing itself of 
topologico-affective ‘differentials’, proceeds incessantly from the beginning, forming 
a sequence of operations that become more and more complicated. That’s how the 
                                                24	  If	   this	  way	  of	  thinking	  makes	  sense,	   trauma	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  this	   proto-­‐spatiotemporal	   matrix,	   enabling	   signifers	   to	   appear.	   Without	   the	  traumatic	  element,	  the	  human	  psyche	  most	  probably	  wouldn’t	  start	  to	  function,	  remaining	  perhaps	  in	  the	  previous	  undisturbed,	  narcissistic	  state.	  25	  As	   it	   is	   presented	   in	   Ferenczi’s	   theory	   of	   catastrophes:	   each	   catastrophe	  repeats	  the	  previous	  one	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  prevents	  its	  repetition	  in	  terms	  of	  affective	  change.	  26	  The	  ‘thalassa’	  and	  the	  later	  primal	  traumas	  remain	  unquestionably	  ‘inside’,	  in	  the	  mind	   of	   the	   survivor,	   in	   the	   interior	   of	   the	   subject’s	   heart.	   Their	   ‘external’	  origin	   doesn’t	   deprive	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   its	   essential	   character	   of	   deeply	  intimate	   experience,	   the	   more	   that	   it	   never	   lets	   the	   individual	   forget	   them.	  Working	  it	  through	  (as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  more	  severe	  examples	  of	  traumatization,	  like	  nightmares,	  hallucinations	  or	  even	  fully-­‐develloped	  PTSD)	  requires	  the	  first	  step	  consisting	  in	  the	  necessity	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  come	  outside,	  leave	  their	  hiding	  place,	  then	  gradually	  learn	  to	  accept	  their	  ‘extimate’	  presence	  in	  the	  psyche	  and	  finally	  try	  to	  integrate	  them	  with	  one’s	  present	  reality.	  There	  is	  also	  constant	  possibility	  of	  sublimation,	  which	  is	  achieved,	  according	  to	  Lacan,	  when	  the	  subject	  can	  reach	  for	   the	   substitute	   and	   refer	   to	   the	   lost	   intrauterine	   coexistence	   with	   a	   loved	  object	   through	   a	   genital	   relationship,	   which	   would	   be	   the	   full	   and	   authentic	  realization	   of	   the	   de-­‐centered	   (inter)subjectivity	   in	   the	   most	   promising	   way,	  allowing	  for	  getting	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  what	  was	  lost	  forever.	  




subject and its particular reality (the world as a specific constellation of the signified, 
resulting from the relation with the Other) is constituted. The distinguished net or nets 
of signifiers, while gaining topological characteristics, represented by all sorts of 
seemingly paradoxical forms of ambiguous, ‘impossible’ figures, may be regarded as 
reflecting the singular, unique destiny of the particular person. The Spinosian 
categories of pleasure and pain may be of use here. As the author of Ethics says in the 
above-mentioned section in the two next definitions of emotions: (II) ‘Pleasure is the 
transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection’ and (III) ‘Pain is the transition 
of a man from a greater to a less perfection’. However, Spinosa underlines: ‘pleasure 
is not perfection itself’ but the transition to it (i.e. to perfection). The use of the term 
‘transition’ (instead, for example, of ‘state’, etc.) underlines the fact that the whole 
business is about the dynamic, energetic operations on affects. As was mentioned 
above, these differential operations could – by reason of some gradual increases or 
decreases - bring about radical overturning of the sign and substituting it by its 
opposite. If such a transformation is important enough, something like a new curving 
of the particular, (inter)subjective topology may emerge as a result. The hitherto 
prevailing topological characteristics may be totally overturned, with the new 
curvature not resembling in anything the previous system of the specific (for a 
particular subject) coordinates. It is worthy of emphasizing that the Spinosian system 
perfectly accommodates the slightest possible changes (as little as differentials are) as 
well as the great, total transformations of the so-and-so curved subjective geometry. 
But why do these changes occur? Because of otherness in its multiple forms and 
multi-leveled epiphanies. We have just outlined the Spinosian contributions to the 
project of joining an example of a post-structural theory of language with a dynamic, 
differential theory of affectivity. The result is one consistent, topological approach to 
the ‘extimate’ (inter)subjectivity and the subject of language as well as of affect (sub-
jected to them both). Now we can investigate these reflections more deeply and – 
using further conceptual instruments – complete the above remarks more fully and 
precisely. The title concept of ‘extimacy’ is strictly connected with the conception of 
the ‘ex-centricity’ of the subject with regard to his or her own ‘essence’. Now, the 
essence of any human being is just there where one thinks it is not - in the 
unconscious, inhabited by the Other. The essence is understood to be desire, 
according to Lacan, directed always towards the Other. The human essence was 
traditionally thought to be the most interior and hidden germ of what a human being is 
to become, containing his/her most important characteristics to be developed. Here, 
all of this intimate realm is as if turned inside out – residing in the Other, even earlier 
than we realize it. Until recently we were used to think about ourselves as autonomic: 
our inside is ‘in’, far or undependable from influences of others, and the outside is 
‘out’, separated and independent. However, ‘otherness’, ‘externality’ and ‘outside’ 
seem to start to be the main organizing, actively operating principles, even when 
there’s not yet any distinct subjectivity. There is only the mentioned kind of proto-
space where the conditions are in the course of being prepared in order to constitute 
the unique ‘place’ for the future human subject, who doesn’t even recognize the agent 
of these preparations. He/she knows nothing of the all-embracing, pantheistic 
‘substance’, nor does he/she know of the Other who ‘curves’ the spatiotemporal 
matrix in order to make of it the environment suitable to sustain life. The more the 
child recognizes the Other, realizes his/her presence and internalizes it, the more these 
processes must implicate a sort of exclusion of not-always-so-easy-worked-out 
intimacy with differing, not always cooperative others. However, the cognitive 




abilities develop gradually, permitting of the more advanced repression, enforced by 
the ‘Oedipal drama’, when the third member of the familial constellation comes into 
play. The repression proceeds by splitting off certain ‘particles’, ‘molecules’ of the 
life-giving ‘substance’, leaving the conscious mind partly emptied and substituted by 
that which we could call the newly formed ‘interior’27. Nonetheless, the one who is 
ready to listen, might hear in the void the calls of longing, certain sometimes getting 
weaker but persistent calls filled with the desire to return to the most true, even if 
unattainable rejected ‘center’, equivalent with one’s most authentic being. This 
sometimes leads to the construction of the newly formed subjective topology, which 
is particularly, sometimes even peculiarly formed, curved, folded, etc., in such a way 
that its unreachable ‘decentered center’ somehow subsists, even if unconscious and 
unrecognizable. Actually, it never stops operating in its ‘close remoteness”, 
supporting the subject in the process of ‘coming to be’. Of course, it’s possible only 
when the circumstances are so good enough as to prepare the subject to survive the 
unavoidable, gradual or sudden withdrawal of the hitherto unfailing presence of the 
figure of the ‘carer’. The resulting singular and unique being, which has the source in 
the ‘substance’, acquires the status of the model for further ‘topologizing’, that is, 
forming new characteristics in accordance with the (pre)determined coordinates and, 
by the same token, the destiny of the individual person.  
The Structure of Language and Topology 
Since the topological matrix, perhaps being the result of a serious, deeply forgotten 
trauma, is ready to receive whatever appears in it and signifies something, the 
question is: who or what provides and juxtaposes the first signifiers? Spinosa would 
say: the substance is modified. And he is right, as far as he would state that the ‘agent’ 
is desire (Spinosa’s conatus). However, if the first signifiers should be received as 
such (as signifying something), certain affects must precede their appearance and 
accompany appearing them. The reason for this is that, since what they signify must 
be important enough for the recipient so as to be registered as having attributed to 
them a certain signified, announcing pleasure or pain, usually associated with the 
presence or absence of the Other. The matrix constituted as the result of trauma is 
open to receive the meaning of what enters it. In fact, the sense of the appearing 
signifiers is important so much that the rules of the first syntax are constructed and 
remembered to make it easier for the subject to act depending on the concluded 
general meaning of certain situations.    
 
The role of otherness (which, to a certain degree, becomes assimilated as what is own, 
however, not in its totality) is crucial for the genesis of (inter)subjectivity as 
‘decentered’ and ‘extimate’. The other subject is necessary for the flow of drive to 
start its circling and this often happens when there has been a certain trauma. This is 
because even the perceived presence of the Other may be experienced as traumatic by 
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reason only of his/her separation, of his/her enigmatic desire (Che vuoi?) and the 
constant, unanswered question of the subject: am I desired by this Other? If the 
response is negative, the individual is unable to survive (cases of the anaclitic 
depression and death) because the source of the life-energy, defined in just this way, 
is absent. There’s no intimacy, even ‘decentered’, that would be indispensable to 
initiate the birth of the newborn’s own desire. 
Some Affective Operations as Conceptualized by Spinosa, 
Interpreted According to Lacan’s Approach 
The first kinds of affect are pleasure and pain (as it seems in the both theories). The 
inaugurating trauma, however interpreted (which may be the famous ‘initial 
catastrophe’ of birth, as Ferenczi would say it, then ‘translated’ into the trauma of 
weaning, next becoming the traumatic impact of the ‘primal scene’, then returning in 
the form of retroaction, etc.) must be forceful and overpowering enough, that is, 
causing great anxiety and/or excitation and/or pain for the incarnated, affective, 
perhaps not yet able to speak. This is necessary for the proto-subject to start 
functioning and retroactively ‘count’ experiences as affectively marked in the 
linguistic terms of ‘good’ or ‘bad’28.  
 
And as long as we are staying with Spinosa, we could say that these first emotions 
differentiate into further ‘vacillations of spirit’, as he calls them (Spinosa, 310). 
There’s no place to go through them all but let’s look at the three of them. The first is 
love (VI) defined as ‘pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause’ (Spinosa, 
312). As Lacan describes love in the seminar Encore, he doesn’t only think that love 
is the substitute for, or disguise of, the lack of sexual relationship. He wants also to 
say something much more important, positive and optimistic: love has really 
ontological meaning, it truly lets us touch the being of our loved one, behind all the 
‘little objects’ that attract, seduce and – finally – deceive us. Our loved other is, when 
really loved, an authentically other Other and so our idea of him/her must be nearly 
totally unclear or confused – otherwise he/she would be transformed into one of the 
worldly objects. It seems to be possible to define love as a specific practice of what 
we can call by the famous name of ‘mindfulness’. Our mind becomes filled out with 
pure ‘signifierness’ of this otherness, exceeding our possibilities of attributing a 
specified signified to it but attracting us with this unclear, indescribable ‘something’, 
characterized by some unfathomable allure and spell. This aspect of love has 
something in common with wonder, being the second emotion in the Spinosian theory 
that is worthy of being focused on, and defined by this philosopher as ‘the thought of 
any thing on which our mind stays fixed because this particular thought has no 
connection with any others’ (Spinosa, 312). What we need here is the specifically 
Lacanian correction of Spinosa: our mind doesn’t function in this way. The signifiers 
generate so many links and chains of thoughts that our mind is constantly busy and 
has no opportunity to fix itself on any single idea. However, even in love we cannot 
have ‘an idea of an external cause’ in its wholeness, as there’s always something in 
the shadow, unpredictable with regard to any good or bad – that’s when love is tied 
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  often	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  future	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  especially,	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  past.	  	  	  




with wonder. This is an important question: if the idea is nearly totally without 
content, representing in its signifying emptiness the eluding characteristics of the 
Other, whose actions may completely surprise us, is it wonder that we feel? What if 
we feel pleasure and attraction to this unknown? It may be said that it’s only then that 
we meet a certain other as a true Other, whose idea ‘has no connection with any 
others’ (other ideas). According to the Lacanian interpretation, the true love always 
embraces wonder. That’s why it is affirmed that love is one of the most singularizing 
emotion.  
Hatred and the Construction of the Linguistic/Affective 
Subjectivity 
Returning to Spinosa, the third emotion that is worthy of focusing on is hatred, 
defined by this philosopher as ‘pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause’. It 
might seem that this definition isn’t quite sufficient: pain accompanied by the 
awareness of an external cause of it doesn’t necessarily have to be hatred. It may be 
equally despair, melancholia, sadness, etc. This affect may be referred to Sloterdijk’s 
analyses of rage, which seem to describe the nature of hatred more accurately. 
However, among them, we find the critique, formulated by this author, who accuses 
Lacan's theory of confusing ‘erotologic’ and ‘thymotic’ affects in his approach to 
desire. As he says about the author of the alleged ‘amalgamate’ of thymos and 
eroticism: ‘At the kernel of his project is the freebooting mixture of the Freudian 
death wish with Hegel's struggle for recognition’ (Sloterdijk, 2010, p. 24). Nothing 
could be more misleading. However, the correction of this mistake demands thorough 
investigations. First, we must take into account what Lacan has to say about subject, 
precisely referring to the (Es)-Other relationship (the symbolic axis) and ego-alter ego 
specular relationship (the imaginary axis). The two characterize any encounter with a 
certain other. However, as was above said about erotologic effects, when this or that 
of our ‘neighbors’ turns out the one we fall in love with (here Lacan uses the Freudian 
term Verliebtheit), we see that the situation is completely contradictory to Sloterdijk’s 
conceptualization. The negative idea may accompany the nascent affect when its 
object is unattainable or doesn’t reciprocate our love. Even in this case we don’t 
usually feel hatred or rage, rather: frustration, melancholy, even, contrary to the 
circumstances, hope. (After all, Lacan used to underline, that love is, on a certain 
level, always reciprocated). In fact, the both kinds of affects – erotologic and thymotic, 
are not only taken into account but also meticulously (in Lacan’s obsessively detailed 
style) differentiated from each other, analyzed separately, and described as ruled by 
their own specific logical laws. In the very general terms, using the above-introduced, 
topological characteristics of levels of language, we might differentiate between 
something that could be called the symbolized, ‘structural’ hatred, and the pre-
symbolic, imaginary equivalent of it, the source of aggressiveness (the same regards, 
for example, love). It is their strict and precise separation that can account for the 
Lacanian version of an ‘ethics of singularity’ – since even hatred, when situated on 
the symbolic level, seems to singularize its ‘object’ as well as love 29. The source of 
the imaginary hatred would be our ego and its specific object – alter ego – the rival in 
the Hegelian struggle for life or death, the object of envy.  
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  Love	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The structural hatred is a prerogative of the subject of language, whose desire goes 
hand in hand with the organized chain of signifiers. In this case the two struggling 
individuals know that they are equal in the light of law and none of them can really 
annihilate the other. There’s no master, no slave, because both of them are subjected 
to law. The content of the imaginary hatred could be – as in the mirror stage – the 
counterpart’s 'better’ coordinated, integrated body, as compared with one’s own, 
‘dismembered’ one, seeming not to form any whole at all, imperfect and clumsy. In 
other words, the imaginary enemy has always something that the ego doesn’t have – 
usually one of the dual, opposite characteristics 30. When the ‘struggle’ rooted in  
rivalry takes place between two adults, the stake may be power, money, control, 
authority, etc. The “see-saw” of desire enforces the exclusion of one term and the 
always risky equilibrium may be destabilized any time. Now, taking into account the 
two of Hegelian struggling individuals, we understand that one of them must risk 
one’s life so as to win the mastery, in order not to die. However, these prerogatives 
and attributes can always change into their opposites: weakness, slavery, etc. When 
we feel hatred on the structural level, these feelings are more integrated and don’t 
exclude their opposites. There is one permanent object of hatred (as is one object of 
love) instead of its splitting into two or more parts. Contradictory characteristics are 
regarded as different attributes of the one and the same object, however complex 
operation it would demand to undertake in order to include them into the multi-
faceted, highly singularized subjectivity of the other. 
 
It follows from what has been said so far that - on the basis of the Spinosian 
geometrical work and the Lacanian topological transformation of investigations of it – 
there is the only way of defining any singular being speaking-affective, like the 
human subject. It refers precisely to particular affects as manifestations of the 
individual’s specificity and particularity. They are in turn reflected in the crucial 
linguistic relations that constitute the unique net of signifiers, constantly being written 
letter by letter and registering the course of this speaking-being’s fate. Love and 
hatred are distinct from all the other affects because of their most singularizing 
character. 
The Triple Topology of ‘Extimacy’ 
The above remarks refer to what can be regarded as the foundation of the affective 
theory of the subject, rooted in the linguistic (post)structure of the unconscious. The 
strictly defined concept of extimité could be explicated in more general as well as 
precise terms by referring to the Lacanian theory of the three registers. Each of them 
involves a sort of ‘exteriority’ and, as such, constitutes an indispensable aspect under 
which the ‘extimate’ may be seen. As linguistically structured, affectively manifested, 
and generating energetic dynamics of desire-ridden (inter)subjectivity, ‘extimacy’ 
may be defined from three points of view described below.  
Imaginary Exteriority 
On the Imaginary level the proper externality is the ideal ego. The primordial ego is 
formed on the basis of what is purely exterior to oneself. It may be, for example, the 
Gestaltic counterpart, being the specular image of one’s or another child’s body 
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(however, the ‘mirror’ needn’t be of a visual kind). The image of the unified body, 
enjoying self-mastery, is idealized for ever as the model, which will remain for good 
and evil the goal of exercising its physical powers and enhancing them. The problem 
is that the jubilation, the feeling of omnipotence ascribed to the idea of one’s 
wholeness and the triumphant attitude towards alter ego, are both realized by the child 
at the same moment when the fact of its real bodily fragmentation, which results from 
the initial lack of coordination. This may be accompanied by the ‘emotional aura’ of 
envy, rivalry, aggressiveness, especially directed at these children who’s mastery of 
bodily movements is greater. It leaves the subject internally splitted. 
 
When reminded of the very important discussion of the see-saw of desire, we discover 
the possibility of reducing this seemingly irreducible gap. Namely, we come to realize 
that the ideal-ego doesn’t exist without support provided by the rudimentary ego, by 
means of the numerous ‘alienating identifications’ (identification aliénante) with what 
seems ideal to him/her. The idea is to try to identify with which is other; and from 
which from a particular subject is alienated. The see-saw of desire, when it is set into 
movement, separates and joins the two main position: the one is of desiring, 
rudimentary ego, personified in a little child, captured by the fascinating attributes of 
the ideal ego and all its admirable attributes. While in the second position, he child is 
exactly what is desired, in that omnipotence that is attributed to the ideal ago. The 
change has happen exclusively thanks to the change of positions of the see-saw. The 
see-saw seems to be en especially lucky metaphor. What was saw previously 
alternately, now constitutes two aspects of – the incipient subject. 
 
It results from the above argumentation, that the price of constituting oneself as a 
separate whole is based on an irremediable alienation from one’s true being. Along 
with the symbol, and more accurately, the first substitution, an element of otherness 
starts to form the person’s identity. Of course, it will be further supported by 
subsequent identifications and next ‘layers’ of the primitive ego. It will launch the 
process of constructing the reality in a projective-introjective way, that is, as based on 
these two mechanisms. The process of acquiring knowledge (connaissance) proceeds, 
in fact, on the basis of building the un-knowledge or mis-recognition (mé-
connaissance) of the ego. What is ‘taken in’ and becomes a part of the immature ego 
is used to construct the ‘outside’ world by throwing out the introjected elements. At 
this stage, what we know of the reality is, in fact, indistinguishable from our own ego 
(Lacan, 1966, p. 70), and that is why the strict separation between ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ domains is questionable from the start.  
 
Before any topological ‘opening’, the affective dynamics constitutes the basis of 
Lacan’s repeated critique of all theories describing the human ego as autonomous and 
independent. Every attempt at the characterization of the human subjectivity must 
take as its starting point ‘an organic insufficiency of its natural reality’ (Lacan, 1966e, 
p. 96) This weakness, on the basis of which the ego is formed, brings along with it the 
resulting splitting or internal gap, understood as the ‘alienating tension’ between the 
ego and its image (Lacan, 1978a, p. 371) or even as ‘internal’ rivalry (Lacan, 1966d, p. 
117). The outlined process, which is summarized in Rimbaud’s phrase: ‘I is an other’ 
(je est un autre) (Lacan, 1966d, p.118) and marked by the advent of a double (Lacan, 
1966d, p. 109), constitutes the indispensable dimension of the human psychism as 
inherently ‘extimate’. This stadium is highly narcissistic in nature: the ‘outside’ is not 
yet truly ‘out’ (even if it seems to be already ‘decentered’). It’s again and again 




basically the same individual as the idealized mirror image that becomes the ideal ego. 
This ideal is in turn projected on the first loved others, although infallibly ‘returning’ 
to the developing psyche, enriched with their introjected characteristics.  
 
The affective stakes of this process are the mentioned ‘triumphant jubilation’, 
accompanied sometimes by aggressiveness (as different from aggression) and rivalry, 
described in terms of the process of alternating, switching positions between O and O’ 
(the mentioned two positions of the see-saw). The former stands for the ‘little other’ 
(ego) and the latter for the ‘counterpart’ (alter ego). The movement between them, 
although partly described here, must be completed by means of the author’s optical 
schemas inserted in the text of the first volume of his seminar, as representing the real 
image and the virtual one  
 
What can be already marked here is that their ‘interaction’ is the effect of the specular 
dialectics of the early movement of desire in its primary, narcissistic, egotical form. 
However, it is preserved also in all later manifestations of drive. It seems to be a 
dynamic, energetic movement, whose nature is useful in explaining the situations of 
Verliebtheit (the situation of rupture, when the desiring subject is captivated by all the 
‘treasures”, he/she sees in another subject but doesn’t find any trace of them in 
himself/herself. This phenomenon takes place, when desire tends to alternately 
wander between the mentioned two positions, having its affective implications: love, 
or more precisely said (at this stage): ‘enamourment’ (enamoration). It is worth 
repeating: The ego sees the virtual image of himself as the ideal ego (or as his/has 
partner), feeling its ‘triumphant jubilation’ which alternately changes to self-
helplessness due to the alleged inflicted harm, and when it is confronted with the 
idealized alter ego or another ‘little other’ tends to feels the contradictory, aggressive 
feeling (the most dangerous are hatred, envy, rivalry, even hatred, giving birth to 
revenge and possesion0. This is not a quiet and peaceful process but rather a difficult 
walk on the imagined line spread between the two dangerous abysses. 
 
Everything changes when the Symbolic appears, with at first totally ‘outside’ 
regulations of law, rules of using language in agreement with the new structure 
imposed on the here-to-fore Imaginary (inter)subjectivity and the ‘external’ world, 
which, gradually substitutes (or rather: organizes) the Imaginary. It is only at this 
precise moment when the subject can encounter the true Other with his/her both 
positive and negative characteristics and treat his/her as equal in the light of law. The 
affective characteristics of love/hatred change accordingly. On the later stage of his 
reflections Lacan even coins – on the basis of constant transformations and even 
intermixture of the affect-related concepts – the term hainemoration. The concept is a 
result of fusing these seemingly opposite affective states into one ‘hate-loving’, 
preserving both the characteristics of hatred and enamourment. This fusion underlines 
the fact that Imaginary sort of ‘outside’, even if unquestionably formative of what is 
deemed to be ‘inside’, is not yet truly external and some more radical kind of 
exteriority must come into play with its own topological stakes. Otherwise speaking, 
the ego must be distinguished from the subject as rooted in the Symbolic.  
Symbolic Exteriority 
The subject’s constitution imposes more complicate challenges on the established 
‘extimate’ origins of the ‘decentered’ being of any individual human entity. The 




earlier ego-ideal becomes superego, which assimilates the moral rules of the society 
as unquestionable and acts in agreement with them, assuming them to be one’s own, 
and their ‘external’ origin becomes forgotten. The subject acquires customs, ways of 
behaving and speaking, thinking, and even all the surrounding world as his/her natural 
home and their structured, topologically curved character remains unconscious. What 
comes into play seems to be in a certain way much more ‘external’, relative to 
anything that is regarded as ‘intimate’, although the borderline is more or less unclear. 
Certain parts just become more ‘tamed’ and ‘domesticated’ as belonging to a newly 
formed subject. It is only then that the ‘one’ starts to truly ‘be’, and only the 
unexpected ‘breaks’, ‘cracks’ and the fissures on the smooth surface suggest that not 
everything functions as it should. Therefore it must be assumed that there exists the 
third register, which refers to the ‘outside’ that is ‘external’ par excellence, and it is 
just in the middle of our safe, cozy ‘inside’ we managed to create thanks to the 
structure of the Other that organizes and orders everything. That means that from then 
on the subject exists as even more divided, staying in the three dimensions at the same 
time. Another subject – meaning another speaking-being – becomes to be recognized 
as “one-in-three’ - as a similar subject but also a totally unknown unknown (and 
unable to get to know the Other) since we don’t even know where our search should 
begin. 
 
As we know, the formation of the primary ego in the mirror stadium is mediated by 
the big Other as the guarantor of the developing imaginary identity, for example, it is 
often the Other (like a parent of the child) who decides what the positioning of the 
mirror’s angle is and what shows itself in the reflection (Lacan, 2004, p. 42). The 
symbolic function is though even earlier: every human being (even before the advent 
of the mirror stadium) appears in the world, which is already structured by symbolic 
meanings. Things are created by words, which ‘kill’ things for their part (Lacan, 
1966b, p. 319) – this is how the famous ‘negativity’ of concepts functions. Signifiers 
exert their effects as well as affect us before we start to understand language, they 
structure our (inter)subjectivity even before our birth. In this way they prepare places 
in the symbolic network for people, these ‘real beings, who, coming into the world, 
right away have the little tag which is their name, the essential symbol for what will 
be their lot’ (Lacan, 1978d, p. 31). This all-embracing character of a symbol can’t be 
overestimated as truly formative of subjects in their complex relationships: ‘Founding 
speech, which envelops the subject, is everything that has constituted him, his parents, 
his neighbors, the whole structure of the community, and not only constituted them as 
symbols, but constituted him in his being.’ (Lacan, 1978d|, p. 30). This ‘envelope’ 
penetrates the very inside of the subject. The external (which is quite contingent), in 
the measure as it becomes a part of the ‘extimate’, is able to impassively and 
relentlessly distribute the playing cards to those totally unaware of whatever fate is 
attributed to them. The cards must be played by those who appear in the ‘game’ in 
flesh and blood. In every case of this very singularized and incomparable process, 
what is ‘external’ is ‘interiorized’, and what is ‘internal’ is ‘exteriorized’, of course, 
the dynamics of movement is twofold.  
 
This is the origin of the subject in the full meaning of the term: the child becomes 
‘sub-jected’ to the symbolic law at the same time when he/she acquires norms as well 
as the ability to respect norms and repress desire. This happens as a result of the 
‘paternal metaphor’, whatever form it takes. Now the only raison d’être of law and its 
rules is securing the proper satisfaction of desire and adequate jouissance. However, 




desire gains, even if repressed, an additional, unintended support: as originating in the 
unfathomable lack of the primary Other it is paradoxically sustained and consolidated 
in its unconscious state by the paternal interdiction (Lacan, 1966a, p. 852).  
 
The ‘extimate’ character of human (inter)subjectivity is made evident by the 
statement that desire takes the form of the Other’s desire (Lacan, 1966h, p. 814). It 
may be read, firstly, that we desire as the Other desires, that is, qua Other, in the 
similar way, starting from the premier Other whose ungraspable desire is interrogated. 
Secondly, desire appears ‘in the margin where the demand separates itself from the 
need’ (Lacan,1966h, p. 814), that is, we desire to be desired by the Other, even when 
our needs expressed in demands are fully satisfied, leaving as unfulfilled that part of 
the demand which expresses the human longing for the Other. Thirdly, the desire 
belongs to the unconscious, being the site of the Other. ‘Non-knowledge’ (nescience) 
of desire accounts for the fundamental alienation: desire is that which we don’t want 
(Lacan, 1966h, pp. 814-815). Therefore we speak of the thoroughly ‘extimate’ subject: 
the unconscious composed of signifying chains is what forms our decentered ‘inside’, 
originating from the ‘outside’, understood as the transindividual structure of signifiers. 
The ‘in-sistence’ of the signifier is correlative with the ‘ex-sistence’ of the subject of 
the unconscious (Lacan, 1966f, p.11). The subject is ‘ex-centric’, that is, ‘decentered 
in relation to the individual’, the latter being constantly occupied by what he/she 
regards as his/her true center – the conscious mind (Lacan, 1978c, p. 17).   
 
The Other is ‘the locus in which is constituted the I who is speaking with him who 
hears […] the locus in which speech is constituted’ (Lacan, 1981, p. 309). This 
undercuts the illusion of self-transparency and self-control attributed to the subject by 
the modern thought, epitomized in the Cartesian philosophy of Cogito (Lacan, 1978c, 
p. 15). It is not the conscious ‘I’, the thinking substance, that speaks, or rather: ‘It 
speaks’ (Lacan, 1986d, p. 244). This is another example of ‘extimacy’ and 
‘decenteredness’: the subject must be regarded as different from the ‘I’, the latter 
being the linguistic entity he/she strives to identify with, The human being, in 
opposition to what the philosophical tradition used to state, is never a fully ‘well-
integrated’ 31  entity. The affective-linguistic ‘intimacy’ of the ‘inner’ realm, 
overflowing with pieces of the (introjected) ‘external’ incessantly tries to infringe the 
separating barrier. There are cracks, scratches, breaks… all of them possibly able to 
become the most fragile and vulnerable points, which always endanger us with into a 
kind of ‘annihilating’ waterfall, capable of transforming everything into a deep chasm 
or ocean of chaos.  
 
The sketched above structuralization of the supposed ‘inside’ by the established 
‘outside’ has as its reverse the structuring of the surrounding ‘reality’ by subjective 
factors The so-called ‘subjectivation of the external world’ (Lacan, 1986a, p. 59), 
results in the incessant mutual ‘interpenetration’32.   
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The castration complex, as understood by Lacan, can be regarded as an 
unprecedented33, nodal point - in fact, the liminal moment of a particular, metanoic 
change of affects. As it seems, the most important part is played by the appearance of 
a new, more radical exteriority, which implicates breaking the interchangable ego-
alter ego amalgam, which was not until now finally separated. Ego-ideal, having 
internalized all the rules of law and order starts to fulfill the function of the superego. 
This critical event involves such affects that seem similar to those associated to the 
mirror stage but of essentially different nature. For example, frustration, instead of 
becoming the usual source of aggression, must be subordinated to strict regulation of 
law, in order not to avoid transforming itself into rage. It’s important to differentiate 
also between sense of guilt and sense of shame. The former tends to appear when I 
broke a certain law and was punished or not but I ascribe to myself the harm I caused 
and feel guilty. The latter is different, for example, having done something wrong 
about which even no one knows, I am afraid of the denunciation not because I am 
afraid of the punishment but because this damage to my self-image becomes known, 
and even if only myself know, I feel ashamed. 
 
The described symbolic coordinates, incorporated usually in the closest family 
members, don’t exhaust, of course, the varieties of exteriority that in the more or less 
propitious conditions may feel at home with the ‘intimacy’ of the human psychism. 
Some ‘one’ is always some ‘body’ and the wisdom of language discloses that the 
most singularizing factor in the ‘external’ world is a person’s body: the homonymy 
(‘some one’ and ‘someone’) is supported by synonymy; that every ‘someone’ always 
exists as a certain ‘somebody’. As it was said above, the neighbor is that being, vis-à-
vis whom the subject is situated - as far as his or her (inter)subjectivity is constituted 
firstly as a body taking position with regard to his or her ‘against’ or ‘en face’. Then 
he/she becomes a partner in the conversation, playmate, or companion with whom one 
engages in various enterprises and adventures.  
 
If the word ‘extimate’ may be considered to be a gradable adjective, the consequence 
of such a state of matters is that sometimes a certain degree of ‘exteriority’ becomes 
tamed and domesticated, so to say, and its impact as ‘alien’ is diminished or 
annihilated. This usually happens when the nearest ‘neighboring’, previously truly 
‘external’ beings: our closest family, friends, lovers, etc., lose their signifying (first of 
all, signifying their otherness) traits. Then they become reduced to the signified, the 
all-too-known, even boring - because completely predictable - entities. This could be 
explained by the fact that someone becomes too close, to (apparently) familiar and 
stops being received at all as a ‘stranger’ This could occur as one of pathologies of 
‘extimacy’, its contradiction being separateness and alienation of a particular human 
entity, becoming closed on oneself, as a monad, not allowing for any part of 
‘otherness’ to penetrate one’s ‘inside’.  
Real Exteriority 
The Imaginary and the Symbolic can be said to encapsulate the more or less smooth 
functioning of language, whose roads are constantly traversed by the subject, trying to 
reveal or conceal the truth of desire. The Real might be described as certain dystopic 
‘places of nothing’, where this functioning failed – implicating a sort of ‘failure’ that 
                                                33	  	  Although	  evoking,	  in	  a	  way,	  all	  the	  earlier	  traumas.	  




invades the structure, threatening to break it. They are absent on any linguistic map, 
previously non-existent, and appearing only when someone happens to leave the 
safety of the structured world. These are the invisible recesses, being examples of the 
perfect ‘no-where’. One becomes lost in some chaotic ‘nothingness’, feeling  
unheimlich34, disoriented because suddenly devoid of the familiar world and any 
useful word to describe one’s experience. One remains unable to find any ways to 
render the character of the horrifying ‘phantoms’ of the inexpressible ghostly 
appearances, usually excluded from the common reality (Real is the only realm where 
they can be ‘disincluded’). They ‘subsist’ and ‘insist’ in certain archaic, forgotten 
areas, being the places of trauma and loss par excellence, leaving the subject led 
astray with no symbolic means to describe the nature of their traumatic character. 
Something unforeseen happens and the previously smoothly functioning elements 
stop their operating in a proper way. They don’t even operate improperly, it is more 
accurate to state that something, so to speak, ‘breaks the flow’. It is impossible for the 
subject to represent the ‘event’ in any understandable way, because the conventional 
linguistic acts are not able to accommodate the overwhelming ‘totality’ of this excess. 
That is why the Real can be defined as an extreme, thoroughly different from any 
known difference, ‘exteriority’. Even the term ‘exteriority’ unjustly enforces us to 
join the Real with the symbolizable, were it doesn’t belong. We can talk of the Real 
when some cracks and holes in speech appear (as Real itself is lacking nothing, even 
more: everything is in its place in the Real). These are ’white spots’ in the linguistic 
meaning, the ones that can’t be in no way filled. As an unwanted remainder of the 
symbolic structuring of the world, the Real is limited to introducing breaks or fissures 
into the hypothetical, primordial unity of that which is ‘at first confused in the hic and 
nunc of the all in the process of becoming’ (Lacan, 1966b, p. 276).  	  
On the one hand, it is in relation to the subject of the Real that Lacan explicitly 
defines extimité as equivalent with the Thing (la Chose), referring to Freud’s concept 
of das Ding, designating mother or her symbolical substitute. She is usually (but not 
necessarily) the first, primordial Other of the child, and is defined by the author as the 
‘intimate exteriority’ (Lacan, 1986c, p. 167) or the ‘excluded interior’ (Lacan, 1986e, 
p. 122), that is, being ‘at the center only in the sense that it is excluded’ (Lacan, 1986b, 
p. 87). This ‘non-object’, around which the unconscious is organized, although 
foreign to the future subject, seems to define his or her destiny 35. The impossible 
character of the Thing as that which is truly Real in the Lacanian sense of the term is 
experienced as traumatic, it is ‘the object of anxiety par excellence’ (Lacan, 1978b, p. 
196). This vision of the unspeakable, even horrifying ‘alien’ kernel of the human 
psyche undermines all conceptions of the subject as separated from any would-be 
‘outside’, to which he or she can become more or less peacefully adapted. On the 
other hand, it is only along with the Thing, its attracting strangeness, evoking 
something long forgotten, that the importance of the number “two” is emphasized and 
highlighted. During the 1972-73 course of his seminar, Lacan will say that it is always 
                                                34	  Unheimlich	  which	  can	  be	  translated	  as	  ’uncanny’	  is	  asssociated	  by	  Lacan	  with	  anxiety	   (angoïsse)	   so	   it	   is	   closest	   to	   the	   Real,	   as	   one	   of	   its	   remainders,	   and	  reminders).	  	  	  35	  ‘The	  Thing	  as	  Fremde,	  strange	  and	  even	  hostile	  on	  occasion,	  the	  first	  outside	  in	  any	   case,	   is	   that	   which	   orients	   around	   itself	   all	   the	   wandering	   of	   the	   subject’	  (Lacan,	  1986a,	  p.	  65).	  




two (deux) of them (d’eux), of two unique, particular cases of ‘one’36 that we should 
begin with (Lacan, 1975, p. 10). The pair of ‘them two’ (deux d’eux) consists not only 
in lying beside each other in bed (au lit). Not only just ‘sleeping together’ but also 
‘lying’ in the sense of saying lies to each other in that which can be read, in the read 
(au lit). ‘Lying beside’ each other creates the newly structured space or surface which 
brings a different topological quality: the unprecedented character of these bonds as 
ontological links between man and woman. The loved Other exists ‘side by side’, as 
closest to me but unavoidably distinct from what I call ‘my own’. Here it would be 
useful to make the ‘extimate’ topology of (inter)subjectivity become more sharply and 
radically polarized by being ordered and further differentiated by the male and female 
structures.  
 
The Thing as the ineffable leftover in which the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ are 
paradoxically united, although irreversibly lost 37 , leaves as its only traces the 
mentioned objects little a (objets petits a). A certain ‘extimate’ impression seems to 
account for the enigma of the paradoxically magnetic but threatening character of 
every love object: ‘inexplicably I love in you something more than you’ (Lacan, 1973, 
p. 241). This special ‘something’ that just this (and no other) person ‘has’, emanates 
attraction which produces its main effect: the metonymic movement of desire which 
carry us with itself for good and evil. The irresistible quality of any objet petit a 
resides in the fact that it represents the lost (due to the Oedipal prohibition) jouissance. 
The lost excessive ‘enjoyment’ that in Freud’s terms is situated ‘beyond the pleasure 
principle’. This ‘surplus jouissance’ (plus-de-jouir) points to the boundary that can’t 
be crossed, otherwise pleasure becomes pain. Paradoxically, desire having as its cause 
the objet petit a, seems to constitute a defense against crossing a certain limit of 
jouissance (Lacan, 1966h, p. 825), that is, allows to satisfy drive ‘safely’, only to 
some supportable degree. The result is the constitutively conflicted being of the 
human psychism and the ultimately impenetrable source of its discordant character. 
The more so that the ‘extimate’, as much ‘included’ as ‘beyond’, transcends every 
conceptualization in terms of the dualistic pairs: ‘inside-outside’, ‘linguistic-affective’, 
‘transcendent-immanent’, ‘otherness-sameness’, etc., regarded as irreconcilable 
oppositions. ‘Extimacy’ hasn’t any localizable roots in us, nor having any cause 
situated in the other subject, is situated somewhere ‘in-between’. It seems to resume 
everything that ‘referentiality’ is about, when it reaches its fullest and most developed 
form. The source of this ‘inner beyond’, inseparable from the primordial relation – 
may be conceived as fulfilling an important transcendental function as the basis of the 
human (inter)subjectivity, its condition of possibility par excellance. However, as 
transcending any attempt at rendering it in symbolic terms, our innermost soul 
amounts to ‘non-being’ so that the ‘extimate’ condition is, paradoxically, the 
condition of the ultimate impossibility of the subject, of his/her thorough definition.  
 
The Real, being the incoherence of the symbolic system itself, is constantly penetrated 
by all sorts of affects, although they are not experienced on the daily basis and escape 
explications or descriptions in a way that would be intelligible enough to be 
understood (lest the listener has personally experienced the invasion of the Real). 
Among the affects induced by the intrusion of the Real, we can especially enumerate 
                                                36	  By	  not	  writing	  this	  noun	  in	  the	  plural	  the	  irreducible	  ‘singularity’	  of	  any	  person	  seems	  to	  be	  even	  further	  underlined.	  37	  We	  can	  never	  enjoy	  it	  enough,	  it	  always	  disappears	  too	  early.	  




the often overpowering and unexplained fascination or obsession with someone, 
enormous anxiety bordering on panic, even strong disgust or repulsion aroused of 
particular objects a (which is well developed in Kristeva’s work on abjection). 
However, the unquestionable first place, as far as objects a are concerned, is anxiety. 
This anxiety is – as Lacan often used to repeat – ‘not without object’. Since objects a 
are remainders of the blissful unity with the Thing, they play the part of the most 
genuine supporters of desire as such. What is of great importance is that anxiety is the 
only affect that doesn’t deceive, it may even fulfill the function of something like a 
sort of ontological proof, as it is the only reliable source of certainty that’s possible at 
all. 
As the formula of the unconscious phantasm shows, the thoroughly ‘extimate’ 
reference is what characterizes the relationship between the ‘barred subject’ and a. 
For the subject’s unconscious the two terms of the relationship are linked by the sign 
of ‘diamond’ between them, which signifies the relation of desire 38. The relation is 
necessarily equivocal and ambiguous, since its terms tend to be confused with each 
other and their positions are interchangeable39. This concerns especially the two 
specifically Lacanian ‘fallen objects’ (added to the three, introduced earlier by Freud), 
which are gaze and voice, the most frequent, as it seems, objects-causes of desire (not 
to be confused with love objects). The scopic and auditory drives seem to belong to 
the primary Other as well as to the future subject, and along with the Freudian three 
originary drives are ‘shared” by all the human beings ready to expose themselves on 
whatever destination awaits them. Their ‘decentered’ and ‘extimate’ characteristics 
determine their whole lives. Every human subject’s sexual bodily parts or their 
derivatives (voice, gaze) are shared with the chosen Others, are being exposed, letting 
the basic drives circle around them, constituting the most dreamt-of sources of 
jouissance. Every object-cause of desire is one-off, unique and singular. It may be 
even said that the only thing that is shared by all the humans is being unrepeatable and 
irreplaceable, as well as their vulnerability and finitude. They may expose themselves 
as such, may expose their vulnerability, their one-and-only, never possible to repeat 
existence to different others, who don’t always have good intentions40. These unique - 
                                                38	  	  As	  a	  is	  what	  has	  fallen	  from	  the	  subject	  due	  to	  the	  strongly	  experienced	  affect	  of	   anxiety,	   we	   can	   speak	   of	   a	   certain	   ambiguous	   element	   in	   the	   mentioned	  matheme	   of	   the	   unconscious	   desire:	   the	   ‘barred	   subject’	   and	   the	   ‘fallen	   object’	  are	   joined	  (and	  separated)	  by	  the	  sign	  pointing	  to	  the	  mutuallity/bilaterality	  of	  whatever	   relationship	   links	   them	   (as	   desire	  manifests	   itself	   in	   diverse	   affects,	  they	  may	  appear	  on	  the	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  ‘extimate’	  quasi-­‐equation).	  	  39	  To	  offer	  one	  example:	  the	  child	  gazing	  at	  their	  parents	  (e.	  g.	  during	  their	  sexual	  act)	  starts	  to	  more	  or	  less	  unwillingly	  phantasize	  of	  its	  being	  gazed	  at	  by	  them.	  	  40The	   good	   term	   introduced	   by	   Derrida	   (who	   doesn’t	   believe	   in	   an	   ‘angelic’	  version	   of	   the	   neighbor)	   seems	   to	   be	   ‘hostipitality’	   (hostipitalité):	   being	  hospitable	  but	  not	  tolerating	  any	  form	  of	  hostility	  Derrida,	  2000).	  This	  reminds	  us	   of	   the	   Lacanian	   ‘hateloving’	   (hainemoration),	   although	   the	   intention	   of	   the	  thinker	  was	  to	  present	  the	  usual	   ‘hustle	  and	  bustle’	  of	  any	  partner’s	  sometimes	  quite	   stormy	   and	   turbulent	   interactions	   with	   his/her	   loved	   one,	   however	   the	  term	   might	   be	   applied	   not	   only	   to	   partnerships	   but	   to	   much	   broader	   social	  context.	  And	  also	  the	  third	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  thinkers	  nowadays	  E.	  Lévinas,	  underlines	  the	  non-­‐angelic,	  egocentric,	  sometimes	  outwardly	  cruel	  relationships	  between	  neighbors,	  and	  finds	  a	  solution	  focusing	  on	  the	  reference	  to	  the	   ‘third’	  




in case of every single person – partial ‘objects’ of oral, anal, genital, scopic and 
auditory drives may be regarded as different sorts of isolated ‘singularities’ (as this 
term is understood in topology). Each of them may be regarded as delimited by a kind 
of ‘event horizon’, the crossing of which suddenly and unexpectedly curves the time-
space of our reality in a total and unforeseen way. The passage may transfer us – like 
through a sort of spatiotemporal tunnel – into something like hiperspace – the 
multidimensional ‘space’ we have ‘forgotten’, we know and don’t know at the same 
time. The partial objects form the five ‘disseminated’ human ‘centers of gravity’ with 
relation to which we are essentially ‘decentered’ but at the same time constantly 
attracted to - and repelled by – their magnetic, compelling influence exerted on us. It 
sometimes happens that the subject we suppose to know, appears in a complete 
different light because of a certain, seemingly unimportant, tiny detail, having to do 
with one of the little a’s like enigmatic flash in his eyes. This feature may incite us to 
fall in love in this person or start to hate him/her. The affect that appears in such 
situations may be what was named by Freud, as mentioned before, by the term 
unheimlich. This affect could be described as connected with an impression of being 
estranged with regard to what was always so familiar and obvious, and now seems 
alien and ‘strange’, without its cozy aura of domestication. Such effective experiences 
might be called ‘extimate pointers’, as they point in the two contradictory directions: 
the habitual, common, ‘external’ perception we got used to, and the personal intimate, 
interior experience.  
 
We may talk of the sequence of the three degrees of ever more radical (with every 
level) ‘exteriority’, constitutive of, correspondingly, the three indispensable kinds of 
ever deeper ‘intimacy’ of the psyche with its ‘internal’ memories belonging to some 
forgotten levels of the archaic past.  If a sudden, unexpected break or momentary lack 
of coherence in the symbolic order of (unconscious) signifiers, which generate and 
correct our usual projections, constituting the signified as the conscious ‘knowledge’. 
In fact, signifiers refer always only to other signifiers (called signifieds, however it 
doesn’t change anything in their signifying nature) in the net of the symbolic structure. 
The net is spread among the mentioned ‘singularities’, supporting them in the 
framework of a determined topology of the ‘extimate’ (inter)subjectivity. The curving 
of the surface determines possibilities of affects that can be experienced by the 
individual as ‘decentered’ with regard to that which exactly accounts for just this 
experience. 
 
                                                                                                                                       (of	   the	   ‘brothers’),	   then	   on	   these	   foundations	   constructs	   the	   suggested	  foundations	  of	  the	  society.	  These	  thinkers	  seem	  to	  have	  elaborated	  more	  mature	  notions	   of	   justice	   and,	   in	   general,	   the	   ethical	   dimension.	  Here	  we	   can	  mention	  also	  Derridian	  khôra,	  meaning	   ‘place’	   (Derrida,	  2016).	  This	  mysterious	  place	   is	  shared	  (shares	  itself)	  with	  those	  who	  need	  it	  and	  starts	  gradually	  to	  recede	  in	  the	  measure	  of	  its	  receiving	  by	  everything	  what	  is	  other.	  And	  so,	  the	  unique	  quality	  of	   this	   space	   is	   vanishing	   in	   order	   to	   make	   more	   space	   for	   those	   who	   most	  desperately	  need	  it	  for	  survival.	  The	  memory	  of	  ‘thalassa’,	  the	  traces	  of	  conatus-­‐driven	   ‘substance’	   become	   the	   living	   and	   live-­‐giving	   space.	   Spatialisation	   and	  temporalization	   proceed	   in	   the	   measure	   they	   are	   needed,	   becoming	   the	  spatiotemporal	   dimension	   where	   all	   the	   humanity	   is	   immerged,	   exposed	   and	  sharing.	  




This is the outline of the transition from the (post)structural approach conceptualizing 
particular levels of language theory taking into account the affect-driven and 
‘extimate’ subject in his/her ‘decenteredness’. This formulation would be very 
difficult without taking into consideration the dynamics of energetic transformations 
of the economy of drive. The reference to the Spinosian approach provides us with a 
precise, quasi-mathematical investigation of energetic movements in terms of 
intensification and weakening of their strength, as their increasing or decreasing 
effectuates changes of values attributed to the experienced events. The result of these 
transformations are changes of affects that are the basic modes of the operation of the 
‘substance’. The affective changes are strictly connected with shifts in representing 
oneself by the subject in the net of signifiers. The subject is finally defined as 
someone who is represented by one of the signifiers, which is in turn represented to 
another signifier, determined by the changes of the signifying slides and slippages, 
which lead to the master signifiers - those representing the subject immediately to the 
Other. In sum, the calculus of affects is set in movement by the Other, to whom the 
subject is in an ‘extimate’, ‘decentered’ way continuously referring. 
Conclusion 
The anti-dualistic concept of extimité would demand a much longer exposition of the 
reasons why ‘extimacy’ in its full (inter)subjective realization transcends the 
simplified dualistic pairs of the most common contradictions. Summarizing, the 
neologism may be understood as comprising the essential linguistic and affective 
characteristics of the human ‘de-centered’ (inter)subjectivity, translated into 
topological terms in the three completely different ways: the Imaginary, the Symbolic 
and the Real. Each of them implicates the particular, unique revelation of ‘exteriority’ 
as formative of what is regarded the ‘intimate’ sphere of any subject (and, of course, 
the formation is always reciprocal).  
 
It must be remembered that the triad of the mentioned ‘spheres’ is, strictly speaking, 
the three separate levels or dimensions of language, three purely linguistic realms. 
However, as it turns out, they are inseparably permeated by affects. If we take, as a 
starting point, Spinosian ‘substance’, the differential operations of increasing (marked 
by ‘+’) or decreasing energy (marked by ‘-’) lead by means of further decreases and 
increases to changes of values. When increasing energy of a chosen affect reaches the 
critical point, the change of value is marked by the opposite of the previous sign. The 
drive (conatus) joins the pairs of ‘+’ an ‘-’ into more and more embracing sequences 
of linguistic signs and with every level of new symbols, the new human subject comes 
into being. The constitution of the origin of grammar, when accompanied by the 
construction of the first signifiers, when set into movement, proceeds by itself until 
the first syntax, affectively marked, is ready to function without help41. Then the 
                                                41	  In	  my	   opinion,	   the	   Lacanian	   theory	   of	   the	   linguistic-­‐affective	   subject	   is	   a	   bit	  unclear	   unless	   we	   discriminate	   different	   ‘stages’,	   ‘processes’,	   so	   to	   say,	   of	   the	  formation	   of	   the	   subject.	   I’ve	   used	   above,	   perhaps	   too	   chaotically,	   the	   three	  different	   ‘verbal	   nouns’,	   which	   could	   be	   better	   enlightened.	   The	   first	   is	  ‘subjection’	  –	  this	  is,	  the	  point	  of	  departure	  of	  every	  living	  entity:	  being	  somehow	  ‘thrown’	  into	  the	  world,	  into	  certain	  independent	  circumstances.	  The	  newborn	  is	  always	  already	  sub-­‐jected:	  to	  its	  first	  Other,	  to	  the	  generational,	  to	  the	  common	  discours	   that	   preceeds	   its	   appearance,	   and	   at	   last	   to	   its	   ‘own’	   discourse	  




system starts to generate its own grammar, producing further rules as needed. At last 
the newly formed ‘rings of string’ appear, constituting in each particular case an 
inimitable constellation of Borromean knot (such that when one of the three rings, 
Imaginary, Symbolic, or Real falls apart, the whole knot is broken). Each knot gains 
their own topological traits, stemming from the whole affective-linguistic history of 
the subject. Every knot represents everyone as singular and unique. Later on, Lacan 
introduces the fourth element - ‘sinthome’- reconstructed, rebuilt old symptom, now 
endowed with new, elaborated, unique qualities, allowing for such a way of living in 
which ‘it stops not being written’ and a person has found one’s own way for 
achieving jouissance. It is the singular sinthome, that keeps strongly together the 
whole of RSI. During the sexual linguistic-affective development 42 43 of the young 
                                                                                                                                       constituted	  of	   the	  sequence	  of	  unconscious	  signifiers.	   It	   is	  dependent	  on	  all	   the	  ‘mirrors’	   it	  meets,	   then	  to	   the	  paternal	   law,	  at	   last	   to	   the	  Other	  as	  such,	   that	   is,	  groundless	  and	  hanging	  in	  the	  void.	  The	  second	  term/phase	  of	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  subject	   (in	   the	   full	   Lacanian	   meaning	   of	   this	   word)	   is	   ‘subjectivation’	   the	  individual	  actively	  takes	  on	  his/her	  back	  what	  was	  piled	  up	  on	  it	  while,	  as	  a	  child,	  it	  remained	  in	  a	  much	  more	  passive	  state.	  This	  is	  what	  perhaps	  Lacan	  has	  in	  his	  mind	  while	   he	   speaks	   of	   ‘eating	   one’s	   Dasein’.	   However,	  maybe	   not	   all	   of	   this	  ‘repas’	  is	  nourishing,	  or	  even	  digestible,	  and	  then	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  third	  ‘avatar’	  of	   subjectivity	  becomes	   indispensible	   –	   ‘subjectivization’	   –	   assimilating	  what	   is	  needed	  and	  rejecting	  what	   is	  dangerous	  or	  uselesss.	   If	   ‘subjectivation’	  means	  a	  becoming	   a	   countable	   individual,	   one	   of	   many	   others,	   the	   singular	   number	   as	  contradicted	   to	   plurality	   of	   what	   is	   similar;	   then	   ‘subjectivization’	   means	  transforming	  all	  of	  this	   into	  truly	  unique	  and	  particular,	  not	  to	  be	  repeated	  nor	  substituted.	  The	  subject	  must	  be	  passive	  and	  active	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (‘medial’	  in	  the	   sense	   of	   old	   Greek	   grammar)	   and	   it	   is	   just	   then	   that	   one’s	   most	   own	  ‘sinthome’	  is	  formed.	  The	  previous	  ‘subjectivation’	  consists	  in	  being	  condemned	  just	  to	  one	  or	  some	  of	  many	  possible	  symptoms,	  where	  there’s	  not	  much	  choice).	  While	  one’s	  own	  extimate	  relationship	  to	  the	  ‘decentered	  center’	  can	  be	  realized	  with	   the	   sublation	   of	   all	   dualisms,	   and	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   subject	   reaching	   the	  fullest	   range	   of	   his/her	   potential	   (sometimes	   it	   may	   be	   regarded	   as	   ‘litter’,	  however,	  litter	  may	  contain	  many	  treasures).	  42	  There’s	  too	  little	  place	  here	  to	  deepen	  the	  subject	  that	  may	  be	  very	  relevant	  to	  the	   explored	   topic	   and	   highly	   interesting	   in	   itself,	   the	   question	   of	   linguistic	  
jouissance	  and	  its	  ‘extimate’	  characteristics.	  Lacan	  develops	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘enjoy-­‐meant’	   (jouis-­sense),	   strictly	   connected	   with	   the	   affective	   dimension	   of	   any	  linguistic	  material.	  The	  words	  as	  specific	  material	  groupings	  of	  sounds,	  provided	  with	   concrete	   meanings,	   are	   permeated	   by	   the	   peculiar	   energy,	   by	   a	   certain	  irreducible	  kind	  of	  pleasure.	  For	  example,	  it	  often	  happens	  that	  a	  certain	  special	  aspect	   of	   a	   word	   or	   of	   a	   group	   of	   words	   is	   associated	   with	   ‘the	   happy	  atmosphere’	   emanating	   from	   it.	   Remember	   for	   example	   the	   almost	   ecstatic	  ‘aura’,	  experienced	  by	  the	  subject	  who	  at	  a	  certain	  moment	  hears	  or	  articulates	  the	   name	   of	   the	   most	   loved	   person,	   the	   warmth	   and	   joy	   felt	   in	   the	   blissful	  atmosphere	  of	  excitement	  and	  pleasure	  that	  surrounds	  and	  penetrates	  this	  small	  group	   of	   phonemes.	   Although	   the	   subject	   doesn’t	   necessarily	   think	   of	   their	  meaning,	  he	   feels	  happier	  –	  he	   is	  affected	  by	  the	   ‘extimate’	   in	   its	  extreme.	  Let’s	  remember	   also	   about	   jouissance	   accompanying	   neologisms,	   word-­‐plays,	  especially	  containing	  a	  pinch	  of	  humor.	  




representatives of the two sexes, each of the three enumerated dimensions undergoes 
profound restructuration. The advent of the Oedipal complex (when what was 
Imaginary undergoes a total ‘rewriting’ in terms of the Symbolic structure) implicates 
the strict, uncompromising accustoming oneself to the norms of language and law. 
However, as the logical consequence of the development of linguistic capabilities of 
the subject, the Symbolic register reveals its Realness (its non-completeness, splits 
and slips, its ‘hanging’ in the void, since there’s no Other of the Other). This results in 
loosening the stiffness of the connections in the net of signifiers, in sequences of 
sounds, etc. This is sometimes accompanied by the much more (than previously) 
individual assimilation of linguistic structures, permitting of their transformation into 
various neologisms, word-plays, etc. This proceeds not without reference to one’s 
symptomatic limitations – resulting sometimes in the transformation of what limits 
and disturbs into what reduces the impact of the relevant symptom on the life of the 
individual, and even sometimes helps to retrieve at least a part of the hidden potential 
of a particular human being. As was mentioned, this is called sinthome – which means 
an important linguistic-affective-behavioral change, often equipping the person with 
his or her own, sometimes quite expressive and vivid, however always highly 
individualized dialect-like language 44.   
                                                                                                                                       43	  There’s	  too	  little	  place	  here	  to	  deepen	  the	  subject	  that	  may	  be	  very	  relevant	  to	  the	   explored	   topic	   and	   highly	   interesting	   in	   itself,	   the	   question	   of	   linguistic	  
jouissance	  and	  its	  ‘extimate’	  characteristics.	  Lacan	  develops	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘enjoy-­‐meant’	   (jouis-­sense),	   strictly	   connected	   with	   the	   affective	   dimension	   of	   any	  linguistic	  material.	  The	  words	  as	  specific	  material	  groupings	  of	  sounds,	  provided	  with	   concrete	   meanings,	   are	   permeated	   by	   the	   peculiar	   energy,	   by	   a	   certain	  irreducible	  kind	  of	  pleasure.	  For	  example,	  it	  often	  happens	  that	  a	  certain	  special	  aspect	  of	  a	  word	  or	  of	  a	  group	  of	  words	  is	  associated	  with	  ‘the	  happy	  atmosphere’	  emanating	  from	  it.	  Remember	  for	  example	  the	  almost	  ecstatic	  ‘aura’,	  experienced	  by	  the	  subject	  who	  at	  a	  certain	  moment	  hears	  or	  articulates	  the	  name	  of	  the	  most	  loved	  person,	   the	  warmth	  and	   joy	   felt	   in	   the	  blissful	  atmosphere	  of	  excitement	  and	   pleasure	   that	   surrounds	   and	   penetrates	   this	   small	   group	   of	   phonemes.	  Although	  the	  subject	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  think	  of	  their	  meaning,	  he	  feels	  happier	  –	   he	   is	   affected	   by	   the	   ‘extimate’	   in	   its	   extreme.	   Let’s	   remember	   also	   about	  
jouissance	   accompanying	  neologisms,	  word-­‐plays,	   especially	   containing	   a	  pinch	  of	  humor.	  44	  	   The	   concept	   of	   sinthome	   couldn’t	   be	   omitted	   in	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	  ‘extimate’	   constitution	   of	   any	   linguistically	   (post)structured	   subjectivity.	   The	  subject	  expresses	  his	   intimate	  world	   in	  worlds	  he/she	  has	  acquired	  from	  other	  language-­‐speakers	   and	   assimilated	   as	   his/her	   own	   way	   of	   not	   only	  communicating	   with	   others	   but	   also	   externalizing	   what	   he	   received	   from	   the	  ‘outside’,	  while	   acting	   and	   realizing	   in	   action	   his/her	   singular	   individuality.	   So	  the	   concept	   of	   ‘sinthome’	   is	   connected	   with	   the	   striving	   to	   work	   one's	   own	  unique	  way	  of	  linguistically	  expressing	  oneself,	  based	  not	  only	  on	  one’s	  abilities,	  talents,	   successes,	   etc.,	   but	   also	   on	   what	   hurts,	   on	   painful	   experiences	   and	  symptomatic	   ways	   of	   coping	   with	   one’s	   limitations.	   So	   the	   basis	   of	   forming	   a	  personal,	   particular	   sinthome	   is	   not	  only	   structural-­‐linguistic	  but	   also	   affective,	  expressing	   all	   the	   perturbations	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	   most	   important	  transformations	  of	  one	  subjective’s	  surface	  of	  sense	  and	  its	  fractures	  and	  breaks	  (compare	  Deleuze’s	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘surface	  of	  sense’	  in	  the	  Logique	  du	  sense),	  and	  




As was said above, the constitution of the Lacanian subject is an effect of the 
connection of the linguistic structure and its affective dimension, accompanied by 
various topological transformations of relationships between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, 
among others45. Perhaps we could say: the Imaginary may be defined as ‘pre-
structure’, the Symbolic – as ‘structure’ tout court, and the Real would deserve to be 
called ‘post-structure’ (that is, what remains of the ‘structural’ when something ‘fails’ 
or ‘falls’ and a certain impasse breaks and stops the whole proper operating). Each of 
the three registers necessarily generates affects because of the ‘extimate’, ex-centric 
constitution of (inter)subjectivity, which is revealed more and more by Lacan in the 
course of the development of his thought, finally summarized in the author’s equation 
of ‘structure’ with ‘topology’. We can think of the notion of ‘extimacy’,  as a sort of 
the ‘intermediary’ concept, joining the structural/linguistic conditions with the 
dimension of affectivity of a living being.  
 
The mentioned elusive, vague remainders and reminders at the same time, which are 
the objets petits a, are ‘localized’ in the central part of the figure of the Borromean 
chain, close to the ‘point’, where the three dimensions intersect (Lacan, 10.12.1974, 
p.19, online). As the above considerations indicate, this ‘structure’ is far from being a 
harmonious synthesis, the interdependence is inseparable from tension. The later 
elaborations focused on this (inter)subjective knot reveal it as the ‘structure’ 
constantly vulnerable to dissolution unless held together by the mentioned fourth 
element – the sinthome – the essential way, ‘chosen’ by the subject, of organizing 
one’s being strictly in relation to one’s ‘extimate’ essence. What is important in this 
new presentation is that although such a formation seems to be the result of a certain 
compromise, nonetheless introducing the sinthome resists ultimately any further 
analysis. Although being the subject’s own, particular mode of channeling jouissance 
(otherwise speaking, realizing the ‘extimate’ possibilities in an acceptable way), its 
economy remains alien to him or her, it is impossible to ‘put our fingertips on’ it 
(Lacan, 1975b, p. 116). The sinthomatic ‘extimacy’ finally constitutes the ‘dit-
mension of body’, enjoyment of speech, of the written, inseparable from jouissance, 
the source of which are the bodily piece(s), surrounded by the never-ending 
                                                                                                                                       being	   the	   accepted	   way	   of	   repeating	   certain	   traumas.	   Sinthome	   appears	  seemingly	   from	   nowhere,	   as	   the	   biblical	   ‘Mane,	   Thecel,	   Phares’,	   written	   by	   an	  invisible	  hand,	  and	  constitutes	  the	  person’s	  most	  own	  (although	  surprising	  even	  for	   the	   subject	   himself	   or	   herself),	   particular	   way	   of	   presenting	   one’s	  transformed	   relatedness	   to	   the	   Other.	   This	   underlines	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  ‘flesh	  and	  blood’’-­‐	  la	  chair	  et	  le	  sang	  -­‐	  of	  letters,	  the	  ‘litteral’	  (in	  all	  of	  its	  senses),	  material	   ‘heart’	  or	   ‘core’	  of	   language,	  so	  often	  treated	  as	  waste	  matter,	  rubbish,	  instead	  of	  the	  indispensible	  vehicle	  of	  sense.	  45	  If	  we	   tried	   to	  deepen	  our	  understanding	  of	  people’s	  relationship	   to	   linguistic	  elements,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  refer	  to	  nothing	  else	  than	  what	  permeates	  –	  whether	  we	   know	   it	   or	   not	   –	   all	   of	   our	   references	   to	   the	   world	   as	   the	   incarnation	   of	  language	  as	  such,	  and	  especially	  of	  our	  own	   ‘sinthomatic’	   language.	  That	  would	  point	   at	   the	   ‘extimate’	   curving	   of	   any	   trajectories	   of	   sense-­‐giving,	   of	   sense-­‐appearing,	   of	   sense-­‐operating,	   accounting	   for	   any	   paradoxical	   (simultaneously	  inner	   and	   outer)	   unique	   ‘fold’,	   any	   particular	   ‘folding’	   of	   every	   entity	   that	   we	  refer	  to	  or	  that	  refers	  to	  us.	  And	  that’s	  why	  nearly	  nothing	  is	  totally	  indifferent	  to	  us.	  




movements of drives. These singular points, where not only ‘it speaks’ but also 
‘where it speaks, it enjoys’ (là où ça parle, ça jouit) (Lacan, 1975b, p. 104).  
 
What is the final goal of the analysis then? Could be the enactment of a particular 
sinthome a justified reason to end the analytic process? Perhaps the proper time to 
terminate the analysis depends on the attitude of the analyzed person to the form of 
the sinthome and the sufficiency of its potential to reenact the ‘extimate’, long 
dormant sexuality? The most preferred moment of conclusion seems to be when the 
person is able genuinely say that the commandment: ‘love your symptom (meaning 
sinthome) as yourself’ is in his/her case fulfilled.   
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